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CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS: THE PEOPLE, THE TEXT,
AND THE HERMENEUTIC OF LEGITIMATION
HOWARD SCHWEBER*
The term “constitutional revolution” is remarkably hard to specify, as a
number of recent authors have demonstrated. For one thing, discussions
sometimes conflate the question of definition—what is a constitutional
revolution?—with the question of what counts as evidence to demonstrate
that such a revolution has occurred. For another, the term “revolution” is
used to mean an upheaval, but it contains etymological reference to earlier
theories that treated political revolution as a reversal or cyclical motion of the
wheel of history. “Revolution” is, of course, the noun form of the verb
“revolve,” and describes the turning of a wheel. Classical historical theorists
from Polybius to Machiavelli and neo-Aristotelian writers such as Ibn
Khaldun presented variations on the idea that history proceeds in cycles.1
Political upheavals and reversals of orders of dominance represent the turning
of the wheel. The idea of revolution of reversal is captured nicely in the title
of a song from the Puritan Revolution in England, “The World Turned
Upside Down.”2 But how are we to decide when a change in the distribution
of powers among the branches of government, for example, signifies such a
reversal rather than just a rearrangement?
One way to think about these questions is to shift our focus to a single
individual. The evidentiary question—when do we know that a revolution
has occurred?—depends on mass actions and attitudes. But the definitional
question is qualitative—what kind of change in constitutional thinking counts
as a revolution?
Imagine an individual whose thinking about
© 2021 Howard Schweber.
*
Professor of Political Science, affiliate Law School Faculty, University of WisconsinMadison. Versions of this paper were previously presented at the University of Wisconsin Political
Theory Workshop and the University of Texas-Austin.
1. For examples of cyclical patterns in history in these writers’ works, see MARCUS TULLIUS
CICERO, THE REPUBLIC OF CICERO bk. I ch. 42–46 (G.W. Featherstonehaugh trans., G. & C. Carvill
1829), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/54161/54161-h/54161-h.htm); NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI,
DISCOURSES ON THE FIRST DECADE OF TITUS LIVIUS bk. I, ch. 2 (Ninia Hill Thompson trans.,
Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. 1883), https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10827/pg10827images.html; Bruce Lawrence, Introduction to IBN KHALDÛN, THE MUQADDIMAH: AN
INTRODUCTION TO HISTORY – ABRIDGED EDITION (N.J. Dawood ed., Franz Rosenthal trans.,
Princeton Univ. Press 2015); POLYBIUS, THE HISTORIES 371–413 (Robin Waterfield trans., Oxford
World’s Classics 2010).
2. JOHN
RENFRO
DAVIS,
The
World
Turned
Upside
Down
(1643),
http://www.contemplator.com/england/worldtur.html.
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constitutionalism has undergone a change. Under what circumstances would
we describe the change in that individual’s thinking as “revolutionary”?
Moreover, in this setting, the phrase “constitutional revolution” seems inapt;
what is being described is more a revolution in constitutionalism, a change
in the conception of the kind of political order a constitution creates and the
principles on which it is based. The term “constitutional revolution,” in other
words, should be reserved for situations where the change in constitutional
practice reflects an equally deep change in constitutional meaning: hence a
revolution in constitutionalism.
In their recent book, Gary Jacobsohn and Yaniv Roznai point in this
direction when they describe constitutional revolution as a “paradigm shift in
the basic principles or features of the constitutional order.”3 The use of the
term “paradigm” is evocative, referencing Thomas Kuhn’s description of
changes in dominant modes of scientific understanding in The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions. Earlier historians of science had viewed their subject
as an uninterrupted story of endless progress, as in Karl Popper’s 1937
description: “[A]s a matter of historical fact, the history of science is by and
large a history of progress. (Science seems to be the only field of human
endeavor of which this can be said.).”4 Kuhn argued that this was an
inaccurate description, and that scientific understanding proceeds by
transitions between discontinuous and mutually incomprehensible
“paradigms.”5 Kuhn did not arrive at this idea from nothing. He saw himself
applying the same model to the development of science that other historians
had applied in numerous other areas, particularly the history of art.6
Art history was a particular source of inspiration for Kuhn, and
specifically the work of Ernst Gombrich. The first draft of Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, in fact, had contained extensive discussion of art
history in comparison with the history of science; that discussion was
removed in order to create a more tightly focused discussion, a decision Kuhn
reached only after he exchanged extensive correspondence with Gombrich.7
Although Kuhn removed the explicit references to art history, it remained the
case that he conceived of his paradigm model as similar to the periodized
3. GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN & YANIV ROZNAI, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS 61
(2020).
4. KARL R. POPPER, THE MYTH OF THE FRAMEWORK: IN DEFENCE OF SCIENCE AND
RATIONALITY 12 (M.A. Notturno ed., 1996).
5. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 1 (1962) (“This
Essay attempts to show that we have been misled by [previous understandings] in fundamental
ways. Its aim is a sketch of the quite different concept of science that can emerge from the historical
record of the research activity itself.”).
6. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 208 (2d ed. 1970)
(emphasis added).
7. J.C. Pinto de Oliveira, Thomas Kuhn, the Image of Science and the Image of Art: The First
Manuscript of Structure, 25 PERSPS. ON SCI. 746, 757 (2017).
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treatment of art that Gombrich had made famous. “[I]t treats such topics as
the role of competing schools and of incommensurable traditions, of
changing standards of value, and of altered modes of perception. Topics like
these have long been basic for the art historian but are minimally represented
in writings on the history of science.”8
In a later discussion of the concept, Kuhn clarified both the role and the
key elements of a paradigm. The key role of paradigms was to explain the
fact of communities of understanding: “A scientific community
consists . . . of the practitioners of a scientific specialty. . . . Such
communities are characterized by the relative fullness of communication
within the group and by the relative unanimity of the group’s judgment in
professional matters.”9 The core elements of this shared understanding, in
turn, comprised a formalized language, accepted models, and agreed-upon
exemplar cases.10
In a later discussion, Kuhn proposed that a more accurate term than
“paradigm” might be “disciplinary matrix.”11 In his telling, the core aspects
that such a disciplinary matrix would comprise would be a shared set of
symbolic generalizations, a set of accepted models, and mutually agreedupon exemplar cases.12
What is true of artists and scientists is equally true of lawyers,
construing the term “lawyers” broadly to include attorneys, judges, and legal
academics. Legal professionals are a relatively insulated community with
high barriers to entry, a technical shared language, and a readily identifiable
disciplinary matrix that determines the scope of what counts as respectable
practice. In one way, law is more like art than it is like science, as both art
and law presume an audience. Shifts in the governing paradigm of artistic
representation taught viewers to perceive art differently than they might
8. THOMAS S. KUHN, Comment on the Relations of Science and Art, in THE ESSENTIAL
TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE 340, 340 (1977).
Gombrich’s description of Picasso’s Cubist period provides a nice illustration of the idea of changes
in modes of perception and understanding in painting. In particular, Gombrich opined that Picasso
and his contemporaries reasoned:
If we think of an object, let us say a violin, it does not appear before the eye of our mind
as we would see it with our bodily eyes. We can, and in fact do, think of its various
aspects at the same time. Some of them stand out so clearly that we feel that we can
touch and handle them; other[s] are somehow blurred. And yet this strange medley of
images represents more of the ‘real’ violin than any single snapshot or meticulous
painting could ever contain.
E. H. GOMBRICH, THE STORY OF ART 574 (16th ed. 1995); see generally E. H. GOMBRICH, ART
AND ILLUSION: A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REPRESENTATION (1960).
9. THOMAS S. KUHN, Second Thoughts on Paradigms, in THE ESSENTIAL TENSION:
SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE 293, 296 (1977).
10. Id. at 297.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 297–98.
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previously have done. There was never any illusion among viewers that it
was the world of represented objects that had changed; Egyptians in the
classical period did not believe that all humans were two-dimensional beings
who always stood sideways to the perspective of a viewer. In other words,
no viewer is unaware of the fact that an artistic image is mediated. To cite a
classic illustration, Magritte’s ironic caption of his painting of a pipe, “[c]eci
n’est pas une pipe,” was merely a provocative reminder of the obvious fact
that dabs of paint on a canvas are representations of objects rather than the
objects themselves.13 Perceptions of art encompass internalized and often
unexamined norms of interpretation that both empower and constrain the
communicative capacity of art experienced as spectatorship.14
The possibility of a paradigm shift emphasizes the historicity of the
experiences of art for viewers as well as artists. The fact of paradigm shifts
in the history of art thus belies any notion of natural or essential relationships
between artistic representations and perception. The same is true of paradigm
shifts in law, although it is often the case that the spectators lack the conscious
awareness of mediation that viewers of art bring to their experiences. Thus,
one may say that there are two distinct elements of a paradigm shift: (1) the
acknowledgement of the constructedness of a mode of expression; and (2) a
conditioning of audiences to appreciate and accept the governing
construction. Both of these elements are important from a democratic
theoretical perspective that imports the term “paradigm” to constitutionalism.
In the case of constitutional understanding, as is the case regarding art,
spectatorship is a core category of what it is that a paradigm shift entails. The
revolutionary artist is one whose work succeeds in both creating and
successfully imposing on the viewing public a new and different set of norms
of interpretation, of what counts as legitimate art. A constitutional paradigm
shift should entail a similar consequence. That is, a revolutionary change in
constitutional understanding is one in which the standards of legitimacy that
define the experience of spectatorship and the relationship between the work
of art (the text) and the viewer (citizens) are reconfigured.15
An analysis of governing paradigms is not an approach that focuses on
the form of events, but rather their content. “Legitimacy” may be a test for
the replacement of a constitutional system or text with a new one, or it may
be a test for what counts as “constitutional.” Moreover, there is no
assumption (as sometimes bedevils the use of “paradigm” in both the history
13. This is Not a Pipe—Magritte’s Most Famous Painting, PUB. DELIVERY (Apr. 22, 2021),
https://publicdelivery.org/magritte-not-a-pipe/.
14. These standard observations from the field of cultural studies received a deep exploration
by Walter Benjamin, particularly in his titular essay. See generally WALTER BENJAMIN, THE WORK
OF ART IN THE AGE OF MECHANICAL REPRODUCTION (J.A. Underwood, trans., PENGUIN BOOKS)
(2008).
15. See generally GARY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY (2010).
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of art and the history of science) that there are neatly demarcated phases of
development in accordance with which one paradigm replaces another;
claims of legitimation are always contestable. The test for identifying a
constitutional revolution, in other words, may not be entirely separate from a
test for identifying an irreconcilable division in constitutional understanding
that has the capacity to provide the basis for a constitutional civil war.16
In this Essay, that is the dimension on which I want to focus: changes in
paradigms of constitutionalism understood as conceptual categories of
legitimation, not the consequences of applying those categories to practice.
In the constitutional context, this breaks down into two inquiries. First, what
is the basis of legitimacy? In answering this question, I will explore the idea
of constituent power, an old idea that has provoked a good deal of recent
discussion. Second, what do different legitimating theories look like—that
is, in what ways do they differ such that we can identify a shift from one to
another as a revolutionary change? Here, I will examine the idea of
constitutional hermeneutics. The argument of this Essay is that a
constitutional revolution occurs when there is a change in the governing
norms of interpretation that alters the terms of legitimation by creating a shift
in the paradigm of interpretation, or in other words, a change in constitutional
hermeneutics. Just as a revolution in science involved a shift in the models,
exemplar cases, and vocabulary that made up the disciplinary matrix of the
enterprise—and just as a shift in the artistic paradigm additionally involved
conditioning viewers to experience art in a new and different way—a shift in
the constitutional paradigm involves introducing a new and different
hermeneutical relationship between the collective readers—the people—and
the text. A successful shift in the constitutional paradigm occurs when the
dominant understanding of what counts as a legitimate expression of
constitutionalism is changed to a degree that it is incommensurate with the
understanding that had been dominant in the previous period.
Framing the discussion in this way departs from the common
vocabulary of constitutional interpretation. Questions of constitutional
interpretation tend to be couched in terms of the roles of specific institutional
actors, often judges on constitutional courts.17 But it is a basic political
principle that those actors are agents who represent (with all the myriad

16. Juan Linz has famously argued that presidential systems are inherently unstable because
their elements—the branches of government—depend on different and incommensurate bases of
legitimation. Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, J. DEMOCRACY, Winter 1990, at 51–53.
17. The focus on judicial review as a core issue of constitutionalism is in large part a reflection
of an uncritical acceptance of a particular institutional arrangement. See generally LARRY KRAMER,
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2005)
(critiquing the excessive focus on judicial actors as the basis for understanding constitutionalism in
the American tradition).
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variations of that concept18) the sole authorizing agent, the people. Thus,
what is ultimately at stake in debates over interpretation is the relation of “the
people” to “the text,” because any intermediary role ultimately requires
validation by the people for its legitimacy.19 If our core political commitment
is to the idea of constituent power, that relationship should be the focus of
our understanding. This inquiry also invites a reconsideration of our
conception of constitutional politics. That is, one of the motivations behind
this inquiry is a desire to push back against the reduction of constitutionalism
to only constitutional politics. The argument is that a focus on what Michael
Polanyi called “the tacit dimension” of historical knowledge (a concept he
applied to scientists and artists as well as historians). The term “tacit
dimension” refers to the things that people know without knowing that they
know them. That is, how we know things is influenced by assumptions we
accept as true without being able to articulate them and by knowledge that
we cannot specifically articulate.20 An investigation into the tacit dimension
of constitutional politics reveals the powerful influences of competing
languages of justification.21 In the case of constitutional politics, that
language is grounded in an understanding of the hermeneutical relationship
between the people and the text.
Asking about the hermeneutic dimensions of the relationship between a
people and a text provokes a range of inquiries. One question is normative:
Does commitment to a particular form of constitutionalism entail an equal
commitment to a definable set of hermeneutic principles? Are there, for
example, ways of describing the reader-text relationship that are inconsistent
with a commitment to the idea of popular sovereignty and/or constituent
power? Alternatively, we might ask a less normative, less provocative, more
analytical question: If there is a change in the prevalent way of
conceptualizing the hermeneutic relationship between the people and the
18. The literature exploring different conceptions of political representation is far too large to
review here. For a few representative exemplars, see generally HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE
CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1972); BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT (John Dunn et al. eds., 1977); MICHAEL SAWARD, THE REPRESENTATIVE CLAIM
(2010); Howard Schweber, The Limits of Political Representation, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 382
(2016).
19. Bonnie Honig, Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in Democratic
Theory, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 12 (2007).
20. MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION (1996). Polanyi uses the quotidian example of
recognizing a face in the crowd. “We know a person’s face, and can recognize it among a thousand,
indeed among a million. Yet we usually cannot tell how we recognize a face we know. So most of
this knowledge cannot be put into words.” Id. at 4. Polanyi argued that the same reliance on
inarticulable tacit knowledge underlies popular understandings of economics and politics in any
given historical period. In Polanyi’s words, “we . . . know more than we could tell,” a phenomenon
he insisted was common to all attempts at taxonomical classification or descriptions of phenomena.
Id. at 5.
21. Id. at 6.
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constitutional text, is that a change in the constitutional system—perhaps
even a constitutional revolution?
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUENT POWER
A critical element of this discussion is an initial assumption that
arguments for constitutional legitimation ultimately derive from a theory of
popular sovereignty expressed as “constituent power,” meaning the ultimate
power of the people to constitute the sovereign through an act of constitutionmaking.22 That is, the implications of a theory of hermeneutics for
constitutional theory derive from its implications for constituent power.
Scholars take different views about the origin of the idea of constituent
power. Andreas Kalyvas traces the idea to Marsilius of Padua’s text,
Defensor Pacis.23 N. Srinivassan identified the source of the concept in
seventeenth-century English Levellers’ 1648 call for authorized
representatives acting on behalf of “the well-affected in every county” to
meet with representatives “chosen by the Army” to create a new local
political order.24 Looking to a still later source, Lucia Rubinelli cites the
French Revolution as the first clear assertion of the concept.25 Regardless,
by the eighteenth century the concept was central to certain discourses in
Anglo-American political thought.
As the case of a constituent assembly demonstrates, however, in reality
“constituent power” is a conceptual model rather than a description of actual
events. It is never the case that the moment of constituent power involves
the entirety of a “people” gathered in one place and engaging in unmediated
deliberation to arrive at a consensus. Instead, as in the example of the
Levellers’ proposal cited by Srinivassan, what is at stake is some version of
a constituent assembly, a group of representatives selected and authorized in
accordance with a set of rules that are accepted as legitimate by the relevant
contemporaneous actors. In turn, the question of defining whose standards
of legitimacy are at issue is, itself, an historical artifact that cannot be justified
by reference to a prior moment of authorization. This is the problem of
22. See, e.g., LUCIA RUBINELLI, CONSTITUENT POWER: A HISTORY 3 (2020); Mark Tushnet,
Peasants with Pitchforks, and Toilers with Twitter: Constitutional Revolutions and the Constituent
Power, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 639, 645–46 (2015).
23. Andreas
Kalyvas,
Constituent
Power,
POL.
CONCEPTS
3
(2013),
https://www.politicalconcepts.org/constituentpower/3/.
24. N. Srinivassan, The Theory of the Constituent Assembly, 1 INDIAN J. POL. SCI. 376, 376
(1940).
25. RUBINELLI, supra note 22, at 4. The Levellers were seventeenth-century English radicals
who favored legal and political equality, religious tolerance, and natural rights. Levellers were
prominent participants in the English Civil War; they were liberals in contrast to the more radical
“Diggers,” who favored abolition of private property. See CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE WORLD
TURNED UPSIDE DOWN: RADICAL IDEAS DURING THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 107–50 (1972).
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infinite regress, or what Robert Dahl called the “chicken-egg problem of
democracy”: Who has the authority to define the demos?26
The identification of “the people” in practice, then, is a brute fact of
historicity. But that observation immediately raises a set of profound
problems for legitimacy. Rousseau’s paradox was an early expression of the
problem.27 For Rousseau, the problem was that in order to become good
republican citizens, people had to first experience good laws, yet they could
not be expected to accept good laws until they had become good republican
citizens.28 To solve this chicken-and-egg paradox, Rousseau focused on the
role of a legislator who would use the authority of religion to institute good
laws on a people not yet ready to understand them.29 The result, as Bonnie
Honig points out, is to remove the problem from the present:
In sum, Rousseau casts the paradox of politics as a paradox of
founding in order to reassure his readers, “to imagine another time
when it could be resolved” . . . a time when the lawgiver and all he
represents would be unnecessary, and politics could be more truly
free. In so doing, Rousseau leads his readers to infer that they must
just somehow get through the founding, whether by way of a
lawgiver’s impositional guidance or if necessary by way of a more
explicit violence that can produce by force that which will later
come by way of education and culture.30
That solution, however, is unavailable as the basis of legitimation for a
constitutional democracy grounded in constituent power. Frank Michelman
describes the problem as one of infinite regress; the conditions under which
a constituent assembly operates, for example, cannot themselves be
legitimated by the authority of that assembly.31 We are returned to the brute
historical fact of an exercise of power seeking a basis for legitimation to
ground the constitutional order that it creates.
The paradox or problem can be couched in terms of the relationship
between constituent power and sovereignty (as in authority to make laws),
liberalism and democracy, law and politics, or constitutional and ordinary
26. ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION?: AUTHORITY IN A GOOD SOCIETY 60–61
(1970). For an argument that the constitution of the demos necessarily follows the creation of the
sovereign state, see Sarah Song, The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory: Why the Demos
Should be Bounded by the State, 4 INT’L THEORY 39–68 (2012). For a review of arguments
emphasizing the primacy of the identification of a people prior to the assertion of a legitimate state
authority, see IAN SHAPIRO & CASIANO HACKER-CORDÓN, DEMOCRACY’S EDGES (1999).
27. See Honig, supra note 19, at 3.
28. See id.
29. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT & DISCOURSES 37 (1923).
30. Honig, supra note 19, at 3 (quoting WILLIAM CONNOLLY, THE ETHOS OF PLURALIZATION
137 (1995)).
31. Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS 64, 90 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998).
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law. Regardless of the formulation, the core of the problem is the conflict
between competing claims of legitimation and the difficulty of grounding
either without first assuming the other. As Bonnie Honig frames the issue,
we have to assume the fiction of a true and unconstrained exercise of
constituent power to legitimate democratic self-rule, but we simultaneously
have to assume the fiction of true and unconstrained democratic self-rule in
order to establish a moment of constituent power.32
Constitutionalism, as Honig notes, recasts the problem by making time
a central category:
In place of the synchronic paradox of politics (in which will of all
and general will may be mutually inhabited), and in place of the
paradox of democratic legitimation’s difficulty of securing general
will over will of all, we now have the still difficult but far less
knotty problem of how to find freedom in relation to a past we are
stuck with and did not author . . . .33
Honig reviews several attempts to resolve this paradox. In Honig’s
assessment of the agonistic approach of Chantal Mouffe, the problem is
simply irresolvable; constituent power and sovereignty, law and politics,
liberal rights, and democratic self-rule are necessarily in competition for
supremacy. The most that we can do is observe which is ascendant in a given
place and moment. The tensions between these concepts can never be
resolved;
instead,
“pragmatic
negotiations
between
political
forces . . . always establish the hegemony of one of them.”34 As an example
of a contrasting approach, Honig presents Jürgen Habermas’s response to
Michelman’s challenge that legitimation based on a set of initial
circumstances produces an infinite regress, proposes to treat the elements of
the various binaries as “co-original” by a process of retroactive legitimation
in which the moment of constitutional founding becomes legitimate through
subsequent actions that validate the terms of the discourse established at the
moment of founding. Habermas pointedly argues that what Michelman
describes as an infinite regress is the inescapable consequence of the “futureoriented” character of any democratic constitution:
[I]n my view, a constitution that is democratic—not just in its
content but also according to its source of legitimation—is a
tradition-building project with a clearly marked beginning in time.
All the later generations have the task of actualizing the still-

32. See Honig, supra note 19, at 5.
33. Id. at 9.
34. CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 5 (2000).
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untapped normative substance of the system of rights laid down in
the original document of the constitution.35
The necessary assumption here is that the moment of founding provided
material adequate for its own legitimation. But even that problem, according
to Habermas, can be overcome by treating the founding moment as a subject
of spectatorship; it is the veneration with which the moment of founding is
regarded that legitimates the project of its reenactment. Habermas notes that
Kant used the French Revolution as a signifier for the possibility of moral
progress, but in doing so removed the event from its historicity: “[I]n the
theory itself we find no trace of the constitutional assemblies of Philadelphia
and Paris—at least not the reasonable trace of a great, dual historical event
that we can now see in retrospect as an entirely new beginning.”36
For Honig, Habermas’s solution replaces one paradox with another—
the reference to a time and place of a founding moment to supplement his
purely proceduralist, discourse-oriented version of constitutionalism. Honig
explains:
Habermas needs Philadelphia and Paris to motivate his
“constitutional patriotism.” Without the events to conjure up a
colorful human world of passion, loyalty, betrayal, idealism, and
reason, the idea of affectively attaching to a constitution (which,
after its characteristic nods to the people’s virtue, is simply a list of
offices, procedures, and rules) is about as attractive as kissing a
typewriter. With the place names, however, a Pandora’s box opens.
Philadelphia and Paris represent not simply “constitutionalism” but
two distinct revolutions and foundings, each characterized by its
own unique, contingent drama, intrigue, public spiritedness, and
remnants. In the U.S. case, “Philadelphia” conjures not only the
assembly that produced the new national constitution but also the
many competing conceptions of the American experiment that
were sidelined or minoritized by the assembly and its
constitution. . . . If they are unrecollected in Habermas’ invocation
of “Philadelphia,” that is because they are not, for him, part of its
“reasonable trace.” It is the trace, not the event, that he seeks to
recollect.37
Habermas proposed that ideal conditions of discourse characterized by
equality and mutual respect produce a basis for legitimating the outcomes of
political deliberation. This is a weak answer to Michelman’s point that in
reality all political activities—including moments of constitution-making—

35. Jürgen Habermas, Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory
Principles?, 29 POL. THEORY 766, 774 (2001).
36. Id. at 768.
37. Honig, supra note 19, at 12.
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take place in conditions that have very little to do with such idealized
conceptions of democratic discourse.38
Ironically, as a matter of constitutionalism, Habermas presents us with
yet another Hobson’s choice between two equally unattractive alternatives:
accepting the very non-ideal conditions of “the founding” as constraints on
the future possibility of constitutional change, or abandoning the substitution
of constitution for revolution as the subject of retrospective spectatorial
enthusiasm. In other words, a return to treating an assertion of constitutive
power as a brute historical fact.
Honig’s alternative solution is based on a dissolution of the binaries:
law/politics, constituent power/sovereignty, and liberalism/democracy.39 In
Honig’s view, there is neither the possibility of one element triumphing over
the other nor of both being unified in a single legitimating scheme.40 Instead,
(constitutional) politics is what takes place in the unresolved and
unresolvable tension between claims of “law” and claims of “democracy,”
decision and deliberation, and the competing legitimating principles that they
entail in a process that never reaches resolution but rather persists in an
endless productive tension.41
This brief review of an important discussion of core democratic
theoretic principles is sufficient to clarify two key points about the discussion
of constitutional revolution. First, a shift in constitutional paradigm is a shift
in the understanding of the relation among the elements of the binaries that
Honig wishes to deconstruct: the people as political sovereign and the people
as authors/authorizers of a constitutional order. Second, while Honig’s
approach is both valuable and persuasive as applied to a theory of the
political, it is insufficient if there is a need to characterize different bases for
the assertion of constitutional legitimacy. The question can be presented as
descriptive rather than normative. Given that people do tend to think of
sovereignty and constituent power as binary opposites, what kind of change
in thinking about that relationship constitutes a “revolution” in the paradigm
of constitutional legitimation? Agonistic dominance and discursive cooriginality similarly do little to provide even an analytic description (let alone
normative criteria) for legitimacy, a category that is strangely absent from
these discussions.
Returning to earlier comments about the “brute historicity” of
foundational events, the invocation of constituent power is a contestable
discourse of legitimation rather than an historical description. The
impossibility of a normatively self-justifying definition of “the people” is
38.
39.
40.
41.

See generally Michelman, supra note 31.
See Honig, supra note 19.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 15.
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thus folded into the problem of legitimation for the constitutional order.
What remains is the vocabulary and conceptual apparatus for testing the
legitimacy of a claim.
More specifically, these arguments do little to provide an account of the
legitimacy of a constitutional text. For that, the discussion has to be recast in
terms of hermeneutics. The relationship of people-as-sovereign to peopleas-constituent authority is carried forward in time by the existence of a
constitutional text. A change in constitutional legitimation, then, may be
expressed in a change in constitutional hermeneutics.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL HERMENEUTICS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY
The term “hermeneutics” has ancient Greek roots, but in its more
modern usage—beginning in approximately the seventeenth century—it
refers to religious and specifically Christian principles of textual
interpretation.42 The idea that there may be analogous principles of
interpretations appropriate for legal and constitutional texts is not new; one
important articulation of the idea appears in the nineteenth-century writings
of Francis Lieber.43 Lieber drew less on specific religious practices of
interpretation and more on general theories of language, employing a signreferent theory going back to Hobbes in which there is an ascertainable and
fixed correct assignment of meaning to a linguistic term. In more recent
times, Jaroslav Pelikan has drawn a more direct analogy between the
interpretation of constitutional and religious texts, arguing that the U.S.
Constitution serves as the American sacred text because it “speaks to”
Americans in a way that is not true of other foundational documents.44 These
approaches may be described as “exegetical.”45 The meaning of the text is
located either within itself (as in Lieber’s positivistic theories of language) or
in a source outside both the text and its interpreters (as in a divine source of
revelation). The orientation to time is past-looking, to a moment of
authorship, revelation, or recording. The idea of hermeneutics is the search
42. The etymology of “hermeneutics” reaches back to the Greek god Hermes. As a
philosophical term it refers to various specific theories of interpretation starting with Johann Conrad
Dannhauer’s 1630 text in which he introduced the term hermeneutica. In the nineteenth century,
starting with Friedrich Schleiermacher, the idea of hermeneutics was applied to secular human
affairs. See C. Mantzavinos, Hermeneutics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 22, 2016),
https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/archives/spr2017/entries/hermeneutics/.
43. FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS ch. 1–5 (1853),
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Lieber_Collection/pdf/Legal-and-PoliticalHermeneutics.pdf.
44. JAROSLAV PELIKAN, INTERPRETING THE BIBLE & THE CONSTITUTION 48–49 (2004).
45. The term “exegetical” refers to the word “exegesis,” meaning the derivation of meaning by
the interpretation of a text.
Exegesis, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/exegesis (last visited Oct. 9, 2021). Exegesis is contrasted with “eisegesis,”
meaning the practice of reading a meaning into a text.
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for the correct or true meaning of the text as fixed at the moment of its
creation.
This classical tradition of hermeneutics was supplemented in the
twentieth century by a series of writers who explored the relationship
between reader and text in less structuralist, more critical terms, particularly
by writers in the post-Marxian Critical Theory movement. The core tenet of
that intellectual movement was a rejection of the Kantian ideal of a
transcendental subjectivity in favor of a recognition of an objective,
historically conditioned subject, an idea most fully developed after Marx by
Lukacs and Adorno.46 But objective did not mean determined; critique, and
therefore emancipation, remained a possibility by the exercise of selfdirected application of the historical conditions of subjectivity as the basis
for political action. In other words, the constraining effects of historically
received understandings could be overcome once they were made evident, as
could an understanding of the roles played by technology, culture, and
science in reinforcing dominant modes of understanding. Once, and only
once, we recognize the effects of received understandings on our own
thinking and undertake to critically examine the consequences of this tacit
level of our own understanding, we can attempt to seek alternative ways of
understanding and thus expand (if never escape) our hermeneutic horizons.
What this intellectual movement meant for hermeneutics—legal and
otherwise—was that the exercise of textual interpretation came to be
recognized as an exercise in Selbstkritik (self-critique) that could illuminate
otherwise unrecognized horizons of understanding. The modern starting
point for this later approach is Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method.47
Gadamer deployed the concept of hermeneutic horizons, boundaries on the
capacity of readers to understand concepts. Because each reader or
generation of readers works within their own horizons, the understanding of
historical texts that emerges reflects the limitations of that perspective. And
because both text and reader are bound by horizons of understanding, a
reader’s engagement with a text takes the form of a dialogue in which a
“fusion” of horizons occurs. To illustrate this principle, Paul Ricouer draws
a distinction between “understanding” versus “interpretation,” in which
“understanding” reflects a recognition that written texts stand outside their
authors’ epoche and are subject to being interpreted within the readers’ own
hermeneutic horizons, while “interpretation” refers to the fruitless endeavor
of discerning a meaning that is independent of the reader’s worldview.48
46. See generally ANDREW ARATO & PAUL BREINES, THE YOUNG LUKACS AND THE ORIGINS
OF WESTERN MARXISM (1979).
47. See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1975).
48. PAUL RICOUER, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: ESSAYS ON LANGUAGE,
ACTION AND INTERPRETATION 21 (John B. Thompson ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1981).
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Gregory Leyh specifically applies the implications of modern
philosophical hermeneutics for American constitutional understanding (in
Ricouer’s sense of the term). More importantly, Leyh explores the ways in
which philosophical hermeneutics provides a basis for critique of interpretive
approaches generally. “[P]hilosophical hermeneutics does not pose as a
methodology for accurately reading texts, but instead offers a standard for
the evaluation of all methodological practices whose aim is the understanding
of textual meaning.”49 Leyh’s call for a theory of constitutionally acceptable
modes of constitutional interpretation is the critical hermeneutic project in a
nutshell. This approach reveals the inescapably political nature of an
hermeneutic choice. Just as Leyh asks what mode(s) of interpretation are
consistent with our constitutional commitments, one might ask whether there
is a particular theory of hermeneutics or prescribable hermeneutic practices
that follow necessarily from, say, a commitment to Lockean liberalism.50
The fundamental distinction in forms of constitutional hermeneutics is
nicely captured in the contrast between Pelikan’s description of a religious
text as one that “speaks to” rather than “speaks for” its readers.51 A religious
text that is received from an external authority speaks to its readers; the
author’s voice is heard through the act of reading but those readers play no
part in the construction of that meaning. Their only task is to hear clearly.
By contrast, the text “speaks for” the reader in Ricouer’s and Habermas’s
analyses, as the ultimate result is an understanding of the interpreter’s
horizons of understanding. These distinct (even binary?) approaches, in turn,
map nicely onto the binaries of constituent power and sovereignty, past and
present. Constituent power refers to the idea of a people’s authority to define
its constitutional order—hence the constitutional text speaks for the people.
By contrast, a traditional understanding of “sovereign” is a figure standing
outside the people who decrees law. And yet, another binary distinction
might be layered onto this understanding: the distinction between constative
and performative exercises of interpretation. Jason Frank illustrates the way
narratives of constituent power changed over American history and were

49. Gregory Leyh, Toward a Constitutional Hermeneutics, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI., 369, 380
(1988).
50. The term “Lockean liberalism” refers to John Locke, a seventh-century Scottish
philosopher who is considered the father of liberalism. Locke posited a “social contract” whereby
individuals would surrender some of their natural rights to create a commonwealth governed by a
legislature, which would protect individuals in the exercise of their remaining rights. Lockean
liberalism is associated with strong notions of individual rights and a limited conception of the role
of liberalism. Lockean liberalism is one of the most influential political theories in American
thought in the period of the founding along with civic humanism. See Isaac Kramnick, The “Great
National Discussion”: The Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 3–32 (1988).
51. PELIKAN, supra note 44.
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reflected in dominant constitutional understandings.52 As Frank points out,
this ongoing intervention in the meaning of texts shifts the performative
moment from the past to the present.53 What I referred to earlier as the brute
historical fact of an assertion of constituent power is an example of the
constative. By relegating that constative moment to the past, the possibility
is opened of a performative form of constitutionalism in the present—the
same move Rousseau relied upon to relegate the disruptive moment of
revolutionary founding to the past in order to make room for
constitutionalism.54
III. REVOLUTIONS IN CONSTITUTIONALISM
We can thus formalize an as-yet-undeconstructed binary opposition
between two versions of constitutional paradigms identified by their
hermeneutic approach to the paradox of constituent power. Where a
constitution is understood as “speaking to” we find:
(1) A past moment that was performative, and is therefore experienced
in the present as constative (a simple example is a theory of
authorial intent a la Lieber).
(2) A location of textual meaning outside the hermeneutic horizons of
understanding of the reader.
(3) An effective relegation of the constituent “people” to a position of
spectatorship grounded in a past and completed moment of
performance.
(4) Legitimation based on the assertion of “correct” understanding.
Where a constitution is understood in terms of a present-oriented critical
hermeneutic, we find a very different constellation of ideas:
(1) A past moment of constative assertion (brute historical fact) is now
experienced as the material for performative intervention.
(2) A diachronic project of ongoing and retrospective legitimation that
focuses on the Derridean “trace”55 of the originary moment—
52. See generally JASON FRANK, CONSTITUENT MOMENTS: ENACTING THE PEOPLE IN
POSTREVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (2010).
53. Id. at 243.
54. This argument adopts Judith Shklar’s identification of the general will with constituent
power or constitution-making. Judith N. Shklar, We the People: Foundations, 86 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 775, 776 (1992) (book review); see also David Lay Williams, Justice and the General Will:
Affirming Rousseau’s Ancient Orientation, 66 J. HIST. IDEAS 383, 385–86 (2005).
55. The term “Derridean” refers to French philosopher Jacques Derrida, who is considered one
of the founders of the school of Deconstructionism. One of Derrida’s key points was his challenge
to Western logocentrism, by which he meant the tendency to treat words as having fixed and
absolute meanings attached to objectively real referents. Derrida argued that meaning in language
derives from the play of differences among words rather than from reference to an objectively
verifiable external object; the term “difference” captured the difference(s) between sign and object,
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whether or not one embraces Honig’s assertion of an inescapable
tension in the face of the need for affective bonds of constitutional
fidelity.56
(3) Legitimation based on the assertion of an understanding valid
within the self-critical assessment of present hermeneutic horizons.
(4) A project that is fundamentally incomplete, and hence always
subject to supplementation.
The argument of this Essay is that a move from one of these
fundamentally different hermeneutics of constituent power constitutes a
constitutional paradigm shift, and hence a constitutional revolution. This
approach complicates the relationships among constitutional, political, and
legal revolutions. As described here, a shift in the hermeneutic of
constitutional legitimation may occur without any substantial change in the
arrangement or operations of political institutions and without dramatic
change in the content of legal rules; conversely, political and legal
revolutions may not constitute revolutions in constitutionalism.
Interestingly, one can go further and situate the idea of “constitutional
revolution” in each paradigm. In the “speaking to” understanding, a
constitutional revolution is a displacement of the sovereign people’s
constative assertion of the true understanding of a historical moment in favor
of a rival assertion. The analogy is to the hermeneutic of interpretation
appropriate for religious texts, where divisions among different schools of
understanding turn on questions of who is the authorized sovereign with
legitimate authority to declare the people’s true constitutional understanding.
By contrast, in a “speaking for” approach, a constitutional revolution would
be an event that signifies a sufficient shift in the horizons of understanding
that a present performative intervention yields results that would not be
capable of legitimation by the understanding of an earlier period. This, too,
is the idea of revolutionary change in the hermeneutic of legitimation and
hence in the paradigm of constitutionalism, as the “speaking for” model is
while “trace” identified the exclusions of possible meanings that is necessarily packed into the initial
definition of a sign. An historical originary trace, then, refers to the excluded possibilities of
meaning that were involved in the original construction of strict meaning categories. The influence
of that exclusion can be found in a close examination of subsequent thinking, hence the “trace” of
the excluded meanings remains apparent. Thus, for example, Derrida argues that the Declaration
of Independence contains a paradoxical moment in that there could be no authorized signer of the
Declaration until the Declaration was signed, so that the Declaration and all the thinking about it
that followed is marked by the “trace” of the excluded possibilities of other signers or the necessity
of some kind of prior authorization to make the act of signing possible. Jacques Derrida,
Declarations of Independence, 7 NEW POL. SCI. 7, 10 (1986). For a general review of Derrida’s
thought, see Jacques Derrida, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 27, 2021),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/derrida/#LifWor.
56. In this understanding, the “trace” of the foundational moments that Habermas refers to are
better understood as ghosts called up to participate in the performances of the living.
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distinguishable from the “speaking to” model precisely in that the former
permits the possibility of a change in constitutional paradigm without the
overthrow of an existing sovereign.
CONCLUSION
The argument of this Essay complicates the relationships among
political, legal, and constitutional revolutions. If there is no revolutionary
change in constitutionalism, by this analysis, even a dramatic change in the
organization and practices of institutions or the content of legal rules ought
not to be considered a constitutional revolution. Conversely, where there is
a revolutionary change in the hermeneutic of legitimation, then a revolution
in constitutionalism has occurred, regardless of whether the present political
arrangements are immediately altered as a result. And where two
incommensurate versions of constitutionalism coexist, the text for
constitutional revolution becomes something more disturbing; a test for the
conditions of the possibility of constitutional civil war. So long as such
divisions in the constitutionalist basis of legitimacy are not reflected in
incommensurate political claims, such a conflict may remain only potential.
But at those moments where recourse to fundamental legitimating principles
becomes necessary, the conflict between a constitutionalism of “speaking to”
and a constitutionalism of “speaking for” presents the paradox of constitutive
power. That paradox threatens to burst through the various attempts to
reconcile the two moments of the people: one as sovereign and one as
constitution-maker.

